Tim Bouverie — Appeasing Hitler: Chamberlain, Churchill and the Road to War

Tim Bouverie: Appeasing Hitler: Chamberlain, Churchill and the Road to War (London: Vintage, 2019) 497 pgs.

I know, it sounds cliche. If you look in a dictionary under “appeasement” you will likely find mention or a picture of Neville Chamberlain—possibly both. Yet, as Tim Bouverie contends in his recent book, Appeasing Hitler, there is far more than “appeasement” to the story of Neville Chamberlain’s diplomatic efforts as English Prime Minister in the eighteen months or so before World War Two. The disaster which everyone feared was coming, yet could do nothing to stop, was at hand. Chamberlain tried and failed to prevent it from happening. Postwar history has not been kind to him. His name is synonymous with political appeasement and naivete.

A political journalist now writing in the field of history, in Appeasing Hitler, Tim Bouverie covers the period from Hitler’s rise to power in Germany (January 1933) until England’s declaration of war on Germany (September 1939). Bouverie recounts the behind the scenes diplomatic efforts made by the British government to prevent the Second World War. If you’ve watched any of the recent Churchill movies (i.e., The Darkest Hour, which, for the most part, is outstanding) and wondered about the tensions between Neville Chamberlain (the current PM), Lord Halifax (the king’s personal friend and the likely P.M. after Chamberlain), and Churchill (the loudest voice opposed to Hitler, but discredited in the eyes of his contemporaries due to his role in the Gallipoli debacle of 1915), Bouverie gives the backstory to the distrust (if not dislike) between Chamberlain, Halifax, and Churchill. Appeasing Hitler is well-written and cogently argued. Bouverie captures quite well the sense of futility on the part of the British government which went with trying to change the mind of a megalomaniac (Hitler) with nothing available to them to stop him but Chamberlain’s best of intentions.

Once Adolf Hitler became Chancellor, Germany begin flagrantly scrapping the armament restrictions placed upon her by the October 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The Germans thought these restrictions grossly unfair, and the national resentment toward the victorious allies created the fertile political soil from which Hitler rose to power. In 1933, Hitler withdrew his nation from both the utopian Genevan Disarmament Conference (13-14), and the League of Nations (19). The French greatly distrusted any German action, since France had suffered horribly at German hands in the war, and spent huge sums building the Maginot Line to protect their German frontier. The British, on the other hand, felt as though their good-will efforts toward Germany in the post-War period “had been hurled back in their faces” by Hitler’s actions (19). As Germany began their intense re-armament program, fears grew that yet another cataclysmic war would be fought in Europe. This was a war France did not want, England did not want, and which Neville Chamberlain sought to avoid by using the only means available to him—diplomacy. Even though Chamberlain failed in the end, his efforts would have earned him many frequent flier miles in today’s world. He did his best, ruined his health, was humiliated, and in the end, was no match for Hitler’s deception and stalling tactics.

When Hitler flexed his growing power for the first time, invading Austria in March of 1938 (the Anschluss), it was immediately apparent that there was not much Britain or its arms-length ally, France, could do to stop Hitler militarily, short of a declaration of war—which neither Britain nor France was willing or able to do. German rearmament and actual military capability was consistently over-estimated by the British intelligence. Nevertheless, Germany’s army was growing rapidly, and her burgeoning air force had surpassed England’s and France’s. Still reeling from the effects of the First World War there was little money or will to keep up with the Germans. With few real military options, Chamberlain sought to rebuild earlier foreign alliances but relations with France were strained, the United States returned to isolation, and Russia was now a Revolutionary state ruled by Stalin. “Collective security” was Chamberlain’s only possible response. He lamented that this was not something he wished to do, but felt as though he had no other choice (187).

In May of 1938, given the weakness demonstrated by England and France’s tepid response to the Anschluss, Hitler flexed again. This time he began making preparations to invade the Eastern portions of Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland). British intelligence warned of an imminent German invasion, but this was in reality a German feint to test allied resolve. Chamberlain was planning a trout-fishing vacation when he got word of the German military moves along the Czech border. He complained, “those d__med Germans have spoiled another weekend for me” (205). War was a distasteful thing for Chamberlain. He wished the threat would just go away. Of course, it didn’t.

Despite a defense treaty with France (who did not want to engage Germany alone), an alliance with the USSR, and a relatively strong Czech military with good natural defenses, Chamberlain and the British government saw Hitler’s desire to take the Sudetenland by force as the consequence of the flawed Versailles Treaty. Taking Hitler at his word, Chamberlain assumed that Hitler’s military aims were limited. If granting the Sudetenland to Germany would go a long way towards undoing the ill will generated by the terms of Versailles on the German psyche, then both he and the British ambassador felt justified in pressuring the Czechs to accept the German terms. Surely, Chamberlain felt, Hitler would be satisfied with such concessions, and this act, despicable as it was, would prevent yet another war against Germany—especially when England was not ready or willing to fight such a war.

Whether appeasement or Realpolitik, Bouverie reveals the private diplomatic willingness of the British government to allow Czechoslovakia to be carved up in order to prevent another war (236). While Chamberlain was an incurable optimist who looked for signs of optimism (237)—and Hitler was willing to send such signs to someone so eager to accept them—it was Winston Churchill who had carefully read Mein Kampf, and who, unlike Chamberlain and many others in the British government (418), saw through Hitler’s ruse. Churchill demanded that the British government issue Hitler an ultimatum (239). Instead, it looked as though diplomacy would triumph and that Churchill was just the bellicose war monger many thought him to be.

Convinced he could reason with Hitler, Chamberlain flew to Munich for a face to face meeting with Der Fuhrer, France’s Prime Minister, Édouard Daladier, and Benito Mussolini. Chamberlain’s goal was to invite Hitler to attend a peace summit with all of the participants present. Hitler agreed, but the summit never came to pass. The meeting did produce the infamous “Munich Agreement,” which was signed on September 30, 1938, between Germany, England, France, and Italy, in which Czechoslovakia would cede the Sudetenland and its three million ethnic Germans to Germany. Hitler pledged this was his final territorial claim. In a private meeting with Hitler, an exhausted Chamberlain presented Hitler with a statement entitled an “Anglo-German Naval Agreement” which indicated that this agreement was “symbolic of the desire of our two countries never to go to war with one another again.” Hitler willingly signed, only to tell his startled Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, “Oh, don't take it so seriously. That piece of paper is of no further significance whatever” (286). But Hitler had told Chamberlain, the eternal optimist and a man always looking for positive signs, exactly what he wanted to hear.

Chamberlain, relieved, but bone weary, flew back to England, and gave the short speech from an upstairs window on 10 Downing Street for which he will forever be remembered. “My good friends, this is the second time there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Now I recommend you go home, and sleep quietly in your beds.” These were words of a naive man who could never grasp the depths of Hitler’s treachery. But Chamberlain did learn one important lesson at Munich. “It will be necessary for us to add to our rearmament programmes” (305). When the Blitz came in the summer of 1940, the British air force was able to turn away the Luftwaffe, winning the “Battle of Britain.” Chamberlain’s willingness to spend money on defense led to sufficient numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes ready to defend the nation during its darkest hour.

As soon as Chamberlain boarded his plane to head home, Hitler, who immediately regretted the deal he had just signed, lamented that Chamberlain had “spoiled my entry into Prague” (294). But Hitler had seen enough in Munich to know that the Western Powers were not ready for war, had no taste for it, and would continue to accept his demands (297). He began planning in earnest to take the rest of Czechoslovakia and Poland. On March 15, 1939, Germans troops entered the rest of Czechoslovakia, causing outrage in Britain (324). Daladier told the French government to prepare for war. Bouverie tells us that ‘“Chamberlain, by contrast, did not immediately grasp the transformative nature of the event. Stunned by Hitler’s perfidy, his concern at the Cabinet meeting on the morning of the invasion was to stress the fact that the guarantee to defend the truncated Czechoslovakia . . . no longer existed” (325). In other words, since there was no Czechoslovakia left to defend, nothing else needed to be done. Before he fully understood the gravity of the situation a few days later, Chamberlain remarkably, “declared his intention to continue his policy of appeasement” (325). Once the shock had worn off, Chamberlain did what he could. Conscription was introduced (330), Chamberlain sought ways to strengthen Poland to deter Hitler from invading (338), but to no avail. On September 1, 1939, Hitler’s armies crossed into Poland, and World War Two was underway.

In the end, Chamberlain, who hated war, sought the diplomatic route—he was determined that he could forge peace with Hitler. Yet, after a herculean effort to reach agreement with Hitler at Munich and thinking Der Fuhrer would honor the agreement, Hitler moved on Poland, leaving Chamberlain a discredited, exhausted, and humiliated man, now remembered as an arrogant and vain relic of privilege, who naively thought he alone could reason with Hitler and change his mind. To all the world, it looked like Chamberlain’s diplomacy was nothing more than failed appeasement of a tyrant. Much of that is true, but there is more to the story. And Tim Bouverie tells that story well.

The bottom line is that Chamberlain was more hawkish than I expected (pushing to rapidly expand aircraft production to catch and surpass Germany) and far more skillful in European Realpolitik than I had previously realized. Chamberlain tried (unsuccessfully) to separate Mussolini from Hitler, he forged agreements with Hitler concerning Czechoslovakia (because the British understood they could do nothing militarily to stop Der Fuhrer, and erstwhile ally France was a divided mess) and which, should Hitler break the agreements (as anticipated), make clear to all that a Second War, should it come, was entirely Hitler’s doing. This was a huge political and motivational factor in Britain, given the massive unpopularity of the prospect of a Second World War, which Hitler’s breaking of the Munich agreements did much to mitigate.

But in the end, Chamberlain simply could not bring himself to believe that Hitler would break his word and provoke the unthinkable. Chamberlain was indeed a man of peace, but belonged to a different generation. Noble, yes, but completely unable to grasp what Churchill understood full well—negotiating with Hitler was like appeasing a hungry wolf with a dog treat. You could never appease him enough. It was never going to work. Churchill saw it. Chamberlain saw it too, but denied what he saw.

Bouverie’s outstanding book can be here: Tim Bouverie: Appeasing Hitler

Here’s the audio of Chamberlain’s speech declaring war on Germany in September 1939, after Hitler invaded Poland. Chamberlain tried his hardest to avert war, but Hitler saw this as weakness. Chamberlain's Speech Declaring War on Germany (September 1939)